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I. THE KLAMATH CONFLICT: FISH AND BIRDS BUT NOT ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES 
A. The Imposition of a Working Landscape on an Ecosystem 
  The Upper Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern 
California has long been characterized by its aridity, remoteness 
from population centers, and short growing season.  Today, the en-
tire Klamath Basin is known for the intensity and bitterness of the 
competing demands for its limited, dependable water supplies. 
The Upper Basin irrigation community’s entrenched water enti-
tlements, enjoyed undisturbed for a century,1 are being challenged 
by Indian tribes, government and non-governmental entities act-
ing to enforce the Endangered Species Act (ESA),2 and Lower Ba-
sin fishing communities.3  
 Over a century of intensive upstream irrigation diversions and 
dams has produced a highly stressed ecosystem from headwaters 
to the Pacific Ocean.  Before white settlement, the Upper Basin 
was one of the West’s great functioning wetland ecosystems, a vast 
network of interconnected shallow lakes and marshes.4  The 
Klamath ecosystem sustained both wildlife and Indians.5  The 
marshlands of the Upper Basin supported large local and migra-
tory bird populations as well as populations of two large (up to two 
feet long), long-lived (surviving up to thirty or forty years) fish 
called qapdo and c’wam.6  These fish were venerated by the 
Klamath Indians, for whom they provided a major food source.7  
The ecosystem survived relatively intact until the end of the nine-
teenth century; however, as was the case in many of areas of the 
world, a productive ecosystem was shrunk in size and in function 
to permit irrigated agriculture. 
1. See RICHARD A. SLAUGHTER, JOINT INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE ATMOSPHERE
AND OCEAN, WATER ALLOCATION UNDER STRESS: INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON OR SNAKE AND 
KLAMATH RIVER 19 (2004) (the Snake River basin has a long history of adaptation to change 
compared to Klamath, which had no history of adaptation prior to 2001). 
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2006).
3. The Klamath is actually two basins, an upper and lower. The Upper Basin lies on
the fringe of the Great Basin. The Lower Basin encompasses a large part of far northwestern 
California and runs to the Pacific through a rugged mountainous terrain. Indian tribes and 
commercial and recreational fishermen have long prized the river for its salmon runs.  See 
Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath 
Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 289-92 (2003) [hereinafter Fish, Farms, and the Clash]. 
4. See id. at 291.
5. See TUPPER ANSEL BLAKE ET AL.,  BALANCING WATER: RESTORING THE KLAMATH
BASIN 35-37 (Univ. Cal. Press 2000) (discussing the Klamath area before white settlement) 
[hereinafter BALANCING WATER]. 
6. Id. at 136.
7. Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (And Salmon) An Even Break: Klamath Basin
Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 202 (2002). 
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 The Upper Basin was one of the last areas of the Pacific 
Northwest investigated by trappers8 and opened to white settle-
ment.9  Its remote location initially allowed it to survive the first 
waves of western settlement and “progress.”  The rugged moun-
tains of the Lower Basin ensured that downstream settlement 
would be very modest, except at the mouth of the Klamath on the 
Pacific Ocean.  In Oregon, small-scale irrigation began in the late 
nineteenth century and accelerated after the passage of the Rec-
lamation Act of 1902.10  The Klamath was chosen as one the first 
federal irrigation projects.11  President Theodore Roosevelt over-
ruled the engineers in the newly created Reclamation Service who 
argued that federal funds should be targeted to the areas with the 
best potential for irrigation and instead opted for a policy of the 
geographical distribution of projects.12  President Roosevelt opted 
for distribution of reclamation throughout the West to help his 
chances for reelection in 1904.13  Hardy pioneers, including many 
Czech immigrants fleeing the decaying Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
eventually put some 400,000 acres under irrigation, about half 
supplied by the federal Klamath Project.14  The Upper Basin’s geo-
graphic history lives in place names like Tule Lake, although the 
vast majority of the region’s wetlands were long ago drained and 
converted to agriculture.15
8. Peter Skene Odgen led the first trapper party into the area between 1826-1827.
See JEFF LALANDE, FIRST OVER THE SISKYOUS: PETER SKENE OGDEN’S 1826-1827 JOURNEY 
THROUGH THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER (1987). 
9. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 288.
10. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1902).  For a detailed description and
history of the Klamath Project, see ERIC E. STENE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION HISTORY PRO-
GRAM, THE KLAMATH PROJECT (1994), available at http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/ 
klamathh.html. 
11. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL/CONFERENCE OPINION REGARDING 
THE EFFECTS OF OPERATION OF THE U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S PROPOSED 10-YEAR 
OPERATION PLAN FOR THE KLAMATH PROJECT AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ENDANGERED LOST 
RIVER SUCKER (DELISTES LUXATUS), ENDANGERED SHORTNOSE SUCKER (CHAMISTES BREVI-
ROSTRIS), THREATENED BALD EAGLE (HALIAEETUS LEUCOCEPHALUS) AND PROPOSED CRITI-
CAL HABITAT FOR THE LOST RIVER AND SHORTNOSE SUCKERS 3 (2002) [hereinafter FWS 2002 
BIOP], available at http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/docs/Final_Biological_Assessment_02-25-
02.pdf.
12. DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
1848-1902 312 (1992).   
13. Id. The Clean Water Act similarly distributed sewage treatment grants, distribut-
ing the grants among the states regardless of the severity of pollution. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (2006). Likewise, the Department of Homeland Security now showers high tech secu-
rity around the country in areas of both high and low risk. 
14. STENE, supra note 10.
15. Before white settlement, there were about 185,000 acres of wetlands in the basin;
today only 36,000 remain.  ERNIE NIEMI, ET AL., ECONORTHWEST, COPING WITH COMPETI-
TION FOR WATER: IRRIGATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE ECOSYSTEM IN THE UPPER 
KLAMATH BASIN, 19 (2001) [hereinafter COPING WITH COMPETITION], available at 
http://www.salmonandeconomy.org/pdf/KlamathWater.pdf.  
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B. Ecosystem Restoration Proxies Emerge 
 As the Upper Basin was being drained, there were no strong 
competing uses or opposing interests to “speak” for the ecosystem. 
Nonetheless, for most of the past century, irrigation and the eco-
system were still able to coexist.  For example, the Lost River and 
shortnose suckers, as they are now known, once inhabited all the 
major lakes of the Upper Basin and their tributaries,16 supporting 
multiple canneries.17  These fish remained the target of a recrea-
tional as well as a tribal fishery until catches sharply declined in 
the 1980s.18  The decline continued even as the modern environ-
mental movement laid the foundation for the appreciation of the 
importance of maintaining ecosystem functions including endan-
gered species conservation.  More recently, we have come to recog-
nize that ecosystems provide many valuable human services.19  
 It has proved very difficult to translate this appreciation into 
effective ecosystem conservation.  In contrast to pollution and toxic 
substances control, it has been much harder to conserve ecosys-
tems and to maintain the services that they provide.  Ecology’s in-
sights came long after strong land and water legal entitlements or 
political expectations evolved to support the maintenance of the 
status quo, regardless of the environmental damage that it causes. 
Thus, ecosystem services, as we now define them, are either pro-
vided by proxies or by new institutions, which are generally costly 
because their provision must be overlaid by over-established ex-
ploitation regimes.  In the West, the two existing proxies for eco-
system conservation and service provision to challenge the status 
are wildlife refuges and Indian tribes who seek to maintain his-
toric fisheries.  Both were in place during the heyday of the Recla-
mation Era, but neither was powerful enough to resist the rise of 
irrigation.  
 Before World War I, wildlife refuges were established in the 
Upper Basin, but wildlife conservation was consistently subordi-
nated to irrigation.20  A proud local Indian tribe had inhabited the 
area for over 14,000 years, but just as the Italians rejected the cold 
northern Reformation devoid of pageantry and artistic splendor, 
the Klamaths had no interest in the alien, white idea of irriga-
16. FWS 2002 BIOP, supra note 11, at 21.
17. See id. at 35.
18. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 53 Fed. Reg. 27130, 27131 (July
18, 1998).  
19. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the conceptual foundations of ecosystem
service provision and the difference between conservation of ecosystem function and service 
provision.  
20. See Benson, supra note 7, at 205-06.
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tion.21  The Klamath Indians were first put on a reservation and 
then driven to the brink of extinction.  During the tragedy of the 
Eisenhower administration’s embrace of the idea of ultimate In-
dian assimilation into “white society” through reservation termina-
tion, the Klamath reservation was wiped off the map.22  For most 
of the twentieth century, the white irrigators were able to assume 
that the basin’s limited supplies of water would be almost exclu-
sively dedicated to irrigation in perpetuity regardless of the envi-
ronmental and social costs.  However, the changes in resource use 
triggered by the environmental and Indian rights finally reached 
the Basin by the 1980s, long after other areas of the west had be-
gun to adjust to this paradigm shift. 
C.  Environmental Change Comes to the Klamath 
 The vehicles that brought environmentalism to the Basin and 
continue to sustain it are the ESA and the Indian sovereignty 
movement.23  The Klamaths were eventually restored to tribal 
status,24 and the remnant Tribe supported the listing of the two 
stressed suckers under the ESA.25  During the 1990s, the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fish-
eries Service (NMFS) began to issue Biological Opinions suggest-
ing that the basin’s main storage space, Klamath Lake, should be 
maintained at high summer levels to support the two federally 
listed fish.26  Small percentage cutbacks and wet years avoided an 
outright conflict between the ESA and irrigation until the drought 
summer of 2001.27  To comply with the ESA, the United States Bu-
reau of Reclamation, which administers the Reclamation Act of 
1902,28 ordered the cutoff of ninety percent of normal deliveries to 
the Klamath Project.29  The Bureau took this drastic unprece-
 
 21. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 296. 
 22. The story is briefly told in CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF 
MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 120-121 (2005). See also THEODORE STERN, THE KLAMATH TRIBE: 
A PEOPLE AND THEIR RESERVATION (Monograph 41 of the American Ethnological Society 
1965) 
 23. Id. at 324-27. 
 24. Benson, supra note 7, at 203. 
 25. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Determination of Endangered 
Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg. 27130, 27131 (July 18, 
1988). 
 26. Benson, supra note 7, at 218. 
 27. Between October 2000 and August 2001, the Basin received fifty-four percent of 
its normal rainfall—6.93 compared to 13.05 inches.  Michael Milstein, Clearing Up Water 
Issues in the Klamath Basin, THE PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 29, 2001. 
 28. 32 STAT. 388 (1902) (presently codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). 
 29. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, KLAMATH PROJECT 2001 OPERATIONS PLAN (Apr. 
6, 2001). 
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dented action in response to biological opinions issued by FWS and 
NMFS which concluded that normal summer irrigation releases 
would threaten the survival of the Lost River shortnose suckers, 
bald eagles in Upper Klamath Lake, the project’s principal reser-
voir, and downstream Coho Salmon.30  The potential of the ESA to 
limit state water rights and federal contract entitlements in the 
Upper Basin had long been anticipated,31 especially in the 
Klamath basin, but the 2001 summer irrigation season cutoff was 
the first time that the Bureau had actually closed the headgates to 
protect a listed species. 32  Things got worse. The summer of 2002 
produced a large downstream salmon kill, and downstream, com-
mercial, and recreational fishermen as well as several Tribes have 
brought additional political and legal pressure to the Upper Ba-
sin.33
 Fallout was immediate and dramatic. In 2001, protests and a 
brief outbreak of violence followed.34  The Klamath became a West-
wide—and even national—symbol of the clash between the virtu-
ous, commodity-producing rural West and the economically irra-
tional, illegitimate ESA supported only by “eco-radicals.”35  In the 
end, neither a new Sagebrush rebellion was triggered nor has the 
ecosystem been stabilized.36  Since the summer of 2001, cutoffs 
have been avoided due to a combination of factors, including hav-
ing wet years, a National Academy of Sciences study asserting 
there was insufficient evidence to conclude the chosen lake levels 
were necessary to protect the species in the stressed ecosystem,37 
and a revised Biological Opinion by the farmer friendly, environ-
mentally hostile Bush II administration which spread ESA com-
 
 30. The literature on the Klamath crisis in 2001is already substantial. See Benson, 
supra note 7, for a history of the legal events that led to the 2001 shut down. Post 2001 
events are analyzed in Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3; Marcilynn Burke, Klamath 
Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why it 
(Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y F. 441 (2004); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tar-
lock,  Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resources Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & 
RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Science, Judgment, and Controversy]. 
 31. See OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT, RESOLVING THE KLAMATH (1999), 
available at http://www1.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/klamath_summary99.pdf. 
 32. The Bureau cut water deliveries in 1992 and 1994, but did not cut off all water 
deliveries. Id. at 28. 
 33. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.  
 34. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 321-23.  
 35. See id.  
 36. See id. 
 37. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE 
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY (2003) [herein-
after ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES].  In June 2007, the Washington Post reported 
that Vice President Richard Cheney initiated the NRC request, overruling the objections of 
the former’s lobbyist that independent NRC panels were “a roll of the dice.” Jo Becker & 
Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, THE WASHINGTON POST, Wednesday, June 27, 2007, at 
A01. 
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pliance duties over ten years.38  A wide range of public and private 
stakeholders have unsuccessfully tried to find a more permanent 
solution to balance irrigation and ecosystem conservation, but the 
underlying degradation is continuing and the “problem-shed” con-
tinues to expand.39  Lower salmon fisheries have been severely 
stressed by upstream water use and fishing communities have 
been put at risk.40
D.  A Possible Role for Ecosystem Services 
 Since 2001, two resource use paradigms and the landscape vi-
sions that they support have competed for dominance in the 
Klamath.  The first is the continuation of the West as a commodity 
production region.  The second is a new West of urban archipela-
goes, large biodiversity reserves, eco-tourism and “rationalized,” 
sustainable agriculture.  The first vision views the Klamath as an 
irrigation district that must, at best, accommodate the “accident” 
that it is also the habitat of several endangered species and the 
spawning grounds for Coho Salmon, with the minimum disruption 
of the status quo.  The alternative vision is less clear because it 
could range from an unrealistic pre-white settlement baseline to a 
more realistic managed landscape that supports a wide range of 
ecosystem services and limited agriculture focused on high-value 
specialty crops. 
 These visions lie behind the strategies that all sides follow to 
advance their interests.  For environmentalists and salmon fish-
erman, the rigid enforcement of the ESA is the best way to force 
the necessary changes in the basin.  To irrigators, resistance to the 
ESA and takings suits are the way to maintain the status quo.  
Neither have moved the basin to a more sustainable landscape.  
Therefore, the Klamath Basin would seem to be a good place to ex-
periment with ecosystem services provisions, including provider 
payments, as a way to reduce resource conflicts and reshape the 
landscape. 
 This has not happened to date, although it could happen be-
cause ecosystems are hard to kill physically41 and economic 
 
 38. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT: 
THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED ACTIONS RELATED TO KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATION (APRIL 1, 
2002 - MARCH 31, 2012) ON FEDERALLY-LISTED THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES 1 
(Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT]. 
 39. See Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 324-35. 
 40. Id. at 326. 
 41. The best example of a revived ecosystem is Mono Lake in California. The ecosys-
tem was in danger of collapse from transbasin water diversions. Good scientific research, 
litigation, and public monies have led to the increased tributary inflows which appear to 
have stabilized the ecosystem. Jane Kay, Mono Lake Restoration: Water’s Arising, S.F. 
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stresses are a force for change in the Basin.  The Klamath is not 
yet the United States’ Aral Sea. Upper Klamath Lake remains the 
largest section of the wetlands in that region.42  The lake is very 
shallow, much like a marsh, averaging only between eight feet 
deep when full and three feet deep during dry years.43  In surface 
area, it is the largest lake in Oregon44 and is reportedly the largest 
freshwater lake in the West.45  Other large lakes and marshes re-
maining in the Upper Basin include Lower Klamath, Tule, and 
Clear Lakes.46  It is the law that makes ecosystems hard to re-
store. Upper Basin irrigators have been able to capture the right to 
use most of the flow of the Klamath, and they are naturally reluc-
tant to surrender these water rights or consider alternative land-
scape visions regardless of the environmental and social costs im-
posed on discrete downstream residents and society generally.47
 The case for a service provision experiment is strengthened by 
the growing realization by all parties that it is unlikely that the 
status quo can be maintained in the long run.  Neither the status 
quo nor a return to pre-white settlement conditions are ecologi-
cally, economically, and socially realistic.  The Upper and Lower 
Basins are dynamic eco- and social systems under stress from the 
effects of Project and off-Project irrigation and market forces.48  
The ecosystem stresses include high background concentrations of 
phosphorus and farming practices that use fertilizers, pesticides, 
and manure from livestock operations that washes into the rivers 
and lakes and causes eutrophication.49  Upper Klamath Lake is 
nutrient-rich, and its impaired water quality puts the endangered 
fish at increased risk.50  The operation of Link River Dam for hy-
dropower generation also contributes to the stresses.51  Ecological 
 
CHRON., July 29, 2006 at A1. See generally Craig A. Arnold, Working Out an Environmental 
Ethics: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 2004 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2004).    
 42. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 291. 
 43. Id.   
 44. Harry Carlson et al., Upper Klamath Basin Soil Resources, in WATER ALLOCATION 
IN THE KLAMATH BASIN RECLAMATION PROJECT, 2001: AN ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCE, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 153 (Ore. St. Univ. 2001), available at 
http://extension.oregonstate.edu/catalog/html/sr/sr1037/soil.pdf.  
 45. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5 at 26. 
 46. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 291. 
 47. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 340. 
 48. The Bureau takes the position that “the Project should not be responsible for effects 
of all of the water development and land management activities throughout the Basin” on 
endangered species.  BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 38, at 2.  
 49. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES, supra note 37, at 102-22 (tracing out the 
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric causes of lake pollution). 
 50. Id. at 122.   
 51. Despite its ownership of Link River Dam, the Bureau contends that it lacks the 
authority to require PacifiCorp to install fish screens or take other measures to limit en-
trainment at the Dam. FWS 2002 BIOP, supra note 11 at 11. 
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stresses are compounded by economic ones.  For example, the pre-
sent owner of the utility that serves the project, PacifiCorp, has 
announced it will not renew an earlier sweetheart deal between its 
predecessor and the irrigators which provided cheap power rates.52  
Farmers, especially potato growers, find it hard to compete with 
other states and global markets.53  Finally, the specter of de-
creased winter snowpacks and decreased summer flows caused by 
global climate change hangs over the entire region.54
 The Klamath is an ongoing story, and any analysis and conclu-
sions must be discounted because the appropriate time horizon to 
pass judgment is long.  A Yurok fisherman summed it up when he 
said of the possibility of a healthier river, “I may not see it, my dad 
may not see it, . . . Hopefully it will help out my son further down 
the road.”55  This Article examines the case for ecosystem service 
provision as a way to address the basin’s environmental problems 
and explains why most of the incentives that exist in the Basin fa-
vor winner-take-all litigation and regulation as opposed to alterna-
tive strategies built around ecosystem service provision.  The Arti-
cle focuses on three service provision problems: (1) the geographic 
scale of the ecosystem, (2) the pros and cons of using ESA litigation 
as a catalyst to force change, and (3) the problems posed by the ex-
istence of entrenched entitlements.  It concludes that the Klamath 
requires both voluntary and mandatory land and water use prac-
tices which restore and conserve some measure of the traditional 
ecosystem services56 that watersheds long provided before they 
were degraded through intensive development and commodity 
production.  However, to date, the Klamath story only explains 
why ecosystem service provision institutions do not emerge while  
partial, patchy regulatory ecosystem conservation experiments do.  
 
 52. PACIFIC POWER, KEEPING YOU INFORMED: UPDATE ON PACIFIC POWER RATE IN-
CREASE REQUEST (May 9, 2006), available at http://www.pacificpower.net/File/File65387.pdf. 
The decisions were upheld by the California and Oregon public utilities commissions. Pro-
posed Decision, California PUC Docket No. 105-11-022, November 13, 2006, and Oregon 
Public Utility Commission Docket No. UE-170, Order No. 06-172, April 12, 2006. 
 53. In 2000, potato farmers elected not to plant because they could not compete with 
Idaho growers and world markets. Wendell Wood, We Should Stop Blaming Species for 
Problems and Seek Real Solutions, KLAMATH FALLS HERALD AND NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001.  The 
Director of the Oregon Department of Agriculture expressed similar fears about the state’s 
agricultural sectors that refuse to adapt to increased national and international competi-
tion.  Kathy Coba, The First Year in Review, Address at the Eastern Oregon Forum (Feb. 11, 
2004), available at http://egov.oregon.gov/ODA/do_speech_040211.shtml.  
 54. John M. Melack et al., Effects of Climate Change on Inland Waters of the Pacific 
Coastal Mountains and Western Great Basin of North America, 11 HYDROLOGICAL  PROC-
ESSES 971, 973 (1997). 
 55. John Driscoll, Klamath Confluence, EUREKA TIMES-STANDARD, May 22, 2006, 
available at http://www.klamathforestalliance.org/Newsarticles/newsarticle20060522.html.    
 56. See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
870 (2005). 
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Those trying to design more successful service provision experi-
ments will have to work harder at overcoming the barriers found 
in the Klamath and many other basins. 
 II. ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION: THE WAY OF THE FUTURE? 
A. The Ecosystem Service Idea 
 The scientific construct of the ecosystem is ecology’s most im-
portant contribution to environmental protection, but it has proved 
difficult to implement the teachings of ecology in part because 
ecology continually evolves.  The original idea that natural sys-
tems should be walled off to the maximum extent possible from 
human intrusion to conserve their inherent stability has given way 
to a more complicated understanding of ecosystems as dynamic 
systems responding to stresses and changing over time.  Modern 
ecology now views ecosystems as dynamic, complex systems con-
tinually adapting to change and stress.57  Ecosystems are neither 
stable nor chaotic, but continue to evolve at different rates over 
different spacial scales.  The rate of change is not continuous, and 
systems can display equilibria states for long periods of time but 
then collapse, and cascading change can occur.58  
 This vision has sparked a debate about whether society should 
actively and adaptively manage ecosystems for their functions or 
services or some combination of both.  Ecosystem function and ser-
vices are related but are analytically different.  Ecosystem function 
refers to the various physical processes that ecosystems perform.  
Ecosystem services refers to those functions that provide concrete, 
monitizeable benefits to human welfare.59  However, in practice, 
the line between function and service is hazy, especially since we 
tend to address the issue of ecosystem conservation through imper-
fect proxies that do not make a clear function-service distinction.  
 The focus on the role that ecosystems play in providing useful 
 
 57. See C.F. Hollings & Lance H. Gunderson, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive 
Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYS-
TEMS 1-23 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002) (discussing a series of ecosystem 
changes). 
 58. C.F. Hollings et el., Sustainability and Panarachies, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTAND-
ING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 72-77 (2002). 
 59. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, for example, posits four categories of 
services: (1) the provision of food and water, (2) the regulation or prevention of adverse im-
pacts such as disease, (3) support for other production activities, and (4) cultural services 
such as recreation. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: 
NATURAL ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 7 (2005) [hereinafter LIVING BEYOND OUR 
MEANS], available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.429.aspx. 
pdf. 
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services to humans reflects two powerful recent trends.  First, the 
emphasis on lost ecosystem services reflects the rise of biodiversity 
as an organizing concept for a variety of uncoordinated resource 
management objectives.60  Biodiversity conservation requires that 
ecosystems be viewed as a functioning unit rather than a discrete 
collection of species.  Put differently, all species and the natural 
processes that support them are potentially equally important.61  
Second, the ultra-utilitarian rationale for ecosystem and biodiver-
sity protection reflects the capture of much of the environmental 
policy discourse by science and welfare economics.62
 This said, the question becomes: Does ecosystem service provi-
sion offer positive advantages in areas such as the Klamath com-
pared to the current litigation-regulation strategies that are being 
followed?63  Much energy has been devoted to the development of 
environmental ethics, but the strongest case for environmental 
protection remains the ability to show that protection can be justi-
fied by hard numbers.64  Science-based, utilitarian solutions have 
the potential to appeal to a wide variety of interests.  They are less 
polarizing than appeals to higher spiritual and aesthetic values.  
Despite heroic efforts to create a workable system of environ-
mental ethics that encompasses non-humans, environmental pro-
tection remains relentlessly anthropocentric.  It is also harder to 
argue against a policy with dollar values attached.  Finally, be-
cause ecosystem service provision is either tied to a market or to 
government subsidies, it can be a fair and equitable way of reallo-
cating resources.  The problem has been to apply these diverse ra-
tionales from concept to the working landscape.  
 The ultimate issue in the Klamath is whether it is possible to 
move to an alternative, sustainable landscape with a mix of agri-
culture and the enhanced maintenance and restoration65 of impor-
 
 60. See DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE (Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press 1996), for an informative history of the construction of the term. A 
recent United Nations report links biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services.  LIV-
ING BEYOND OUR MEANS, supra note 59, at 12. 
 61. For a masterful analysis of the unanswered scientific questions that the construct 
raises, see Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 364 (2004) 
 62. For the best example of this capture, see LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS, supra note 
59.   
 63. There are, of course, risks to this approach. See Dale Goble, What are Slugs Good 
for? Ecosystem Services and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
415 (2007), (cautioning against shifting the focus from the scientific, non-utilitarian ethical 
concern with ecosystem function to the relentlessly utilitarian focus on ecosystem service 
provision). 
 64. See Science, Judgment, and Controversy, supra note 30. The counter position is 
well-articulated by Professor Mark Sagoff, Price, Principle, and the Environment 135-144 
(2004) 
 65. The need to focus on restoration strategies is forcefully argued in Debra Donahue 
Federal Rangeland Policy: Perverting Law and Jeopardizing Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND 
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tant ecosystem functions and services.  One solution is a mix of in-
duced and mandated conservation practices combined with the 
“post-modern” concept of ecosystem service markets.  Federal and 
state requirements dealing with pollution control and resource 
conservation could work together toward that goal supplemented 
by NGO participation.  However, there has been little considera-
tion of the quantification and commodification of ecosystem ser-
vices as a long term solution in the Klamath.  There are many sin-
cere and hopeful peacemakers at work, but the focus remains on 
maintaining the traditional white irrigation culture to the maxi-
mum extent possible. 
B. From Theory to Action: Some Hard Questions 
 The Klamath illustrates three of the central meta problems 
with efforts to shift traditional resource exploitation-
environmental protection debates to ecosystem services conserva-
tion options.  First, the resource exploitation legacy of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries stack the deck in favor of the pres-
ervation of the status quo.66  Second, the use of a single powerful 
law such as the ESA to change the status quo can, perversely, shift 
the focus from ecosystem function and service conservation to 
adoption of only minimal mitigation measures to save a species 
from extinction or to push the problem forward a few years.  Third, 
the Klamath is, in effect, a heritage area.  The benefits of ecosys-
tem service generation are national, if not global.  However, the 
public and private service providers are disconnected from the 
beneficiaries.  
 To overcome these barriers, three hard problems which often 
arise when one tries to develop a landscape strategy for an area 
that restores a level of lost ecosystem services must be ad-
dressed.67
 
USE & ENVTL. L. 301 (2007).  
 66. The reasons include the existence of entrenched property rights and cultural atti-
tudes that discourage interest in new, cooperative management schemes, especially where 
endangered species are present. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and 
Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and Psycho-
logical Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423 (2003). 
 67. This Article does not address the question of the optimal institutional mix to pro-
vide ecosystem services. Since Secretary Bruce Babbitt’s tenure as Secretary of the Interior, 
there has been a movement to solve ecosystem problems by ad hoc public-private stake-
holder processes.  Professors Jody Freeman and Daniel A. Farber call this development 
modular regulation. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 
54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005). For a more skeptical but ultimately hopeful view see Peter M. 
Lavigne, The Movement for American Ecosystem Restoration and Interactive Environmental 
Decisionmaking: Quagmire, Diversion, or Our Last, Best Hope?, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 
(2003).   
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(1) What is the geographic extent of the ecosystem 
and how does its scope and scale impact the incen-
tives and disincentives to provide ecosystem ser-
vices? The Klamath’s two basins create a great dis-
parity between those who enjoy ecosystem benefits 
and those with the power to degrade them. 
 
(2) Do environmental and resource management 
laws help or hinder efforts to make ecosystem provi-
sion an integral part of a landscape conservation 
plan? For example, the ESA has been hailed as hav-
ing the power to induce long term changes in public 
and private behavior. The Klamath experience, how-
ever, suggests that the focus on listed species widens 
the disconnect between the ESA and existing state 
water law entitlements. Because the reallocation of 
water is vital to ecosystem service provision, the lim-
ited ability of the Act to change long-established wa-
ter allocation patterns is troubling. 
 
(3) Is a “Coasian” solution always possible or must 
there be a reassignment of property rights? The 
widespread assumption in the ecosystem service lit-
erature is that equity and efficiency counsel “brib-
ing” existing entitlement holders to provide the nec-
essary services.68 In the Klamath Basin, the law of 
prior appropriation and federal reclamation stack 
the deck in favor of irrigators and against either ex-
isting ecosystem service providers or the emergence 
of new ones,69 thus effectively shifting the cost of 
water conservation to federal tax payers. Put differ-
ently, there is a potential moral hazard problem. The 
law rewards, rather than penalizes, resource use 
patterns with high social costs. 
III. GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE MATTERS 
A. The Physical Features of the Klamath Basin 
 Before the service provision issues can be addressed, the “prob-
 
 68. See infra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
 69. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 339-40. 
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lemshed” must be delineated.  The geographic scale of the ecosys-
tem influences the barriers and incentives to service provision. For 
aquatic ecosystem problems, the river basin is the presumptive 
geographic area.  However, the practice of good geography may 
only exacerbate the problem.  The presumption holds in the 
Klamath, although the Basin is actually two equally sized sub-
basins each with a different geography, culture, and economy.  Na-
ture flipped the usual pattern; the Upper Basin is relatively flat 
and dry and the Lower steep and wet.  The Klamath watershed 
covers a vast, sparsely populated, remote region in south central 
Oregon and extreme northern California.70  This area is much 
poorer than the urban and exurban areas of these two prime ex-
amples of successful post-industrial states.71  The river originates 
in Upper Klamath Lake, a broad, shallow lake fed by snow melt 
from the Cascade Mountains of Oregon, and flows through the 
Trinity Alps of California, where the Scott, Trinity, and Salmon 
Rivers join it, before it reaches the Pacific Ocean at the Redwood 
National Park.72
 The Upper Basin, often referred to simply as the Klamath Ba-
sin, is the site of the conflicts of 2001.73  It spans across the Cali-
fornia-Oregon border74 and has long been dedicated to irrigated 
agriculture—primarily potatoes, specialty crops and hay.75  It in-
cludes high peaks in the Cascade Mountains that receive more 
than forty inches of precipitation annually.76  But, “its dominant 
feature is a flat, agricultural valley lying just west of the ridge that 
marks the beginning of the forbiddingly arid Great Basin.”77  Only 
about eleven inches of rain fall in the valley each year, making it 
nearly a desert, and water demand exceeds supply about seven out 
of every ten years.78  Agriculture is made even more challenging by 
the area’s high elevation and short growing season.  Because of the 
severe climatic conditions, none of the lands in the region fall in 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s highest productivity class 
(Class I).79
 The Lower Klamath Basin, lying entirely in California, is 
 
 70. Id. at 289. 
 71. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 295. 
 72. Id. at 289. 
 73. Id.at 291. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 299. 
 76. Id. at 291.  
 77. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 291. 
 78. Agriculture is the only important consumptive use of water in the Basin, accounting 
for more than 95 percent of the consumptive use.  See BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 38, at 25. 
 79. Carlson, supra note 44, at 156. 
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dominated by timber-covered slopes and mountainous wilderness 
areas.80  The Lower Klamath River and its tributaries were once 
teeming with Coho and Chinook Salmon,81 allowing the Indians 
along the river to harvest a million pounds annually.82  Wild Chi-
nook are considered superior to farm-raised salmon because of its 
taste and heart-healthy oils.  Like many headwaters areas, the 
Upper Basin was able to put the waters to beneficial use before 
other claims emerged, thereby exporting some of the external costs 
of this allocation downstream.  Salmon runs are threatened by the 
lack of water and other non-anthropocentric factors.83
 Commercial harvest began in the early 1800s and continued 
until the mid-1990s, when the severely declining Coho fisheries 
were essentially closed.84  Coho populations fell from a range of 
50,000 to 125,000 in the 1940s to 6,000 fish in 1996.85  Recrea-
tional harvest of Coho Salmon in the Klamath River and its tribu-
taries continued until the Coho were listed under the federal ESA 
in 1997.  A small tribal Coho harvest, affecting about seventy 
naturally spawning fish per year, remains.86  Salmon conditions 
have deteriorated since 2001.  There was a major die off in 2002,87 
and in 2006 the anticipation of low Klamath fall Chinook runs re-
sulted in sharp reduction in the allowable catch of the Pacific 
Coast salmon fishery in Oregon and California.88
B.  The Geography of Interests 
   The ability of upstream irrigators to shift costs downstream 
 
 80. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 289.  
 81. Id. The Klamath Basin was “the third most important salmon producing river 
system in the nation, producing an estimated 660,000 to 1,100,000 million [sic] adult fish 
annually.” Water Management and Endangered Species Issues in the Klamath Basin: Over-
sight Field Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Resources, 107th Cong. 123 (2001) (statement 
of William F. “Zeke” Grader, Jr., Executive Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fisher-
men’s Associations).  
 82. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 35. 
 83. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES, supra note 37, at 102-22. 
 84. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon / Northern California Coast Evolutionarily 
Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24588, 24593-94 (May 6, 1997).  NMFS 
regulations allow incidental take of Coho in Chinook-directed fisheries off California consis-
tent with Pacific Fishery Management Council regulations.  See 50 C.F.R. § 223.204.  Coho 
are not to be retained, but are impacted by “hook and release.”  NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES 
SVC., BIOLOGICAL OPINION:  KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATIONS 29 (May 31, 2002) [hereinafter 
NMFS 2002 BIOP] available at http://swr.nmfs.noaa.gov/psd/Klamath/KpopBO2002finalMay 
31.pdf. 
 85. Mary Christina Wood, Restoring the Abundant Trust: Tribal Litigation in Pacific 
Northwest Salmon Recovery, 36 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS 10163, 10164 (2006). 
 86. NMFS 2002 BIOP, supra note 84, at 29.   
 87. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 335. 
 88. Fisheries Off West Coast States; West Coast Salmon Fisheries; 2006 Management 
Measure and a Temporary Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 26254-66 (May 4, 2006). 
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illustrates the problem with moving toward an ecosystem services 
provision remedy when the most immediate beneficiaries of ecosys-
tem services are located far from the origin of the service.  Upper 
Basin irrigators have no incentive to provide the services unless 
compelled by the ESA, and downstream fishing communities have 
no incentive to share the cost of service provision.  Shallow upper 
Klamath Lake is the irrigator carry-over storage reservoir, but 
there is little reserve water to release in a drought.  Therefore, at 
least in the eyes of the lower basin, the geography of the Klamath 
creates two classes of parties: “tort feasors” and “victims.”89  The 
“tort feasors” are the Klamath irrigators, who have shifted the ex-
ternal costs of irrigation downstream, and the “victims” are down-
stream tribes as well as commercial and recreational salmon fish-
erman, since lowered flows impair salmon runs.  This perception 
creates an incentive for “victims” to rely on litigation-regulatory 
solutions: full enforcement of the ESA, which in effect shifts the 
provision burdens back to the upstream irrigators who try to shift 
it to the federal tax payers.90  Either irrigation deliveries must be 
cut or a federally financed water bank must provide the necessary 
water.91  The next section addresses the potential of the ESA to 
overcome these barriers. 
IV. THE PROS AND CONS OF UNLEASHING THE ESA PIT BULL 
A. The Catalyst Theory of the ESA 
 Three decades ago, Professor George Coggins described the 
 
 89. I am not asserting that upper stream irrigators are necessarily liable under com-
mon law tort doctrines such as nuisance. These issues are fully addressed in J.B. Ruhl, The 
“Background Principles” of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services — Did Lucas Open 
Pandora’s Box?, 22 J. LAND USE & EVNTL. L. 527 (2007). I am borrowing the analysis devel-
oped by Judge Guido Calabresi, illustrating that the fault system makes liability decisions 
on an “all-or-nothing basis” and makes it difficult to allocate costs efficiency. GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 239-43 (Yale Univ. 
Press 1970).  
 90. Both irrigators and fisherman have received emergency relief. The Oregon Natu-
ral Resources Council put the 2001 disaster relief for the irrigators at $48,625,000.00.  
JAMES MCCARTHY, OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL, CRISIS PROFITEERING: INEQUI-
TIES AND EXCESSES OF KLAMATH PROJECT BAILOUT (2001), available at 
http://www.klamathbasin.info/CrisisProfiteering.pdf.  After the virtual closure of the 2006 
Pacific fishing season, fishermen demanded $81 million, but Congress only authorized the 
release of $2 million from a NOAA emergency fund. David Whitney, House OKs $2 Million 
in Disaster Aid for Salmon Fleet, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 29, 2006, at A3.  
 91. Starting in 2002, the Bureau of Reclamation created a water bank in the Upper 
Basin to met downstream flow obligations. Sufficient water was provided but the Bureau 
cannot quantify the actual impacts. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 
(GAO), KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: RECLAMATION MET ITS WATER BANK OBLIGATIONS, BUT  IN-
FORMATION PROVIDED TO WATER BANK STAKEHOLDERS COULD BE IMPROVED (March 2005) 
[hereinafter GAO]. 
Spring, 2007]  KLAMATH BASIN 223 
 
                                                                                                                  
ESA as “one of the few nearly absolute standards governing man-
agement of the American natural legacy.”92  Among environmental 
statutes, the ESA is relatively unique because it contains substan-
tive as well as procedural mandates.  In practice, the ESA is much 
less draconian than its friends and opponents portray it.  The two 
agencies that administer the ESA have turned it into a more user-
friendly development permit program.  In the majority of cases the 
focus is on mitigation and the use of habitat conservation plans to 
allow the killing of a percentage of listed species.  Nonetheless, 
proponents of species protection and ecosystem conservation sup-
port the use of aggressive ESA litigation as a catalyst to trigger 
more comprehensive long range solutions.  One strategy is to trig-
ger the Section 7 consultation process in the hopes that stringent 
enforcement (or the threat of it) will produce a better result for the 
species and its habitat ecosystem.93  Federal agencies who propose 
actions that may place listed species at risk must consult with ei-
ther the FWS or the NMFS.  These agencies issue a Biological 
Opinion (BiOp), which determines whether the action poses a risk 
to a listed species and outlines the necessary avoidance measures. 
An unfavorable BiOp, such as the 2001 Klamath BiOp, triggers the 
duty to ensure that the action “is not likely to jeopardize the con-
tinued existence” of the species.94 
 There are two ecosystem service justifications for ESA catalyst 
or “rule of law” litigation, that the use of litigation to create a crisis 
that will produce a long run solution for the ecosystem.95  First, it 
can target the optimal or most efficient service provider.  Second, if 
you adopt the “tort feasor”-”victim” approach, the ESA can trigger 
solutions that are fair, that go beyond the narrow mandates of the 
statute, and that are systemwide.  The Klamath Project irrigators 
may be the cheapest cost avoiders because they can cut back pro-
duction in water during short years and take other adaptive meas-
ures.96  Neither salmon nor Indian fishermen have the same range 
 
 92. George Cameron Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in 
Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433,1435 (1982). 
 93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b). 
 94. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).  
 95. The environmental movement began in large part as a legal guerilla movement 
and non-governmental organizations pursued the strategy of asking courts to construct 
strict statutes that imposed substantive and procedural duties that could be characterized 
as environmental. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of “Rule of Law” Litigation, 19 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
 96. In the United States, we still view natural disasters such as drought as beyond 
the control of the victims and thus worthy of government relief. Australia has started, with 
some backsliding in the severe drought that began in this century, on a different course. 
Australian drought policy is premised on the assumption that drought is an expected occur-
rence in the world’s driest climate and thus farmers should take proactive steps to antici-
pate it and to mitigate the risks. See BEYOND DROUGHT: PEOPLE, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 
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of avoidance options.  Putting the service provision cost on irriga-
tors can also be characterized as an example of the “polluter pays” 
principle at work.  For years, the irrigators were able to shift the 
external costs of their water use to others, so it is only fair that 
they now internalize a portion of these costs. 
 The fear of strict enforcement has triggered some very creative 
solutions, such as multi-species habitat conservation plans in 
which the burdens of species conservation are widely shared be-
tween public and private providers.97  However, in the Klamath, 
the ESA has frustrated efforts to develop a basin-wide solution in 
the Upper Basin by focusing on only one class of tort feasors—the 
federal irrigators.  Without a federal nexus, all irrigation opera-
tions can only be addressed through section 9, which prohibits any 
person from “taking” a listed species.98  Enforcement would require 
FWS or NMFS to prove that the actions of a specific entity (an in-
dividual farmer or irrigation district) caused the take of a listed 
fish—a showing that can be difficult to make.  In contrast, the use 
of the Section 7 procedure makes it much easier to look to Project 
irrigators than to non-Project irrigators to bear the costs of protect-
ing the endangered fish.  However, it is easy to see why Project ir-
rigators (and the agency that serves them—the Bureau) would feel 
unfairly targeted by any increased burdens in light of a century of 
undisturbed access to water.  The result in the Klamath has been 
BiOps that leave protection of the listed species in doubt because 
of reluctance to impose inequitable burdens on Project irrigators. 
 In short, the catalyst theory does not appear to have yet 
worked in the Klamath despite many good faith efforts to make it 
happen.  Writing after the drought summer of 2001, Professor 
Holly Doremus and I concluded: 
The Klamath experience . . .  confirms the disconnect 
 
(2003).  
 97. The habitat conservation plan process remains controversial and there are many 
problems with it. My point is only that fear of ESA enforcement provided the incentive for 
ecosystem conservation experiments that go far beyond the requirements of the ESA. Com-
pare Lindell Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New Para-
digm for Conserving Biodiversity, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (1994), and Marc Ebbin, Is the South-
ern California Approach to Conservation Succeeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695 (1997), and Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000), and A. Dan 
Tarlock, THE DYNAMIC URBAN LANDSCAPE IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT 30 127 (2006), 
with Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10592 (1999), and Karen Sheldon, Habitat Con-
servation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 279 (1998). 
 98. A taking includes habitat modification, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), including water withdrawals. United 
States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
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between the ESA and state water law, and the Act’s 
limited ability to change long-established water allo-
cation patterns.  The NMFS 2002 Biological Opinion 
makes a commendable stab at broadening the vision 
of responsibility for improving the Klamath’s eco-
logical condition by calling for initiation of a 
state/federal process to identify non-project water 
that could contribute to flows needed by the coho.  
But that effort, which does not go nearly as far as is 
needed, seems doomed to failure unless the state 
chooses to cooperate.  The Bureau, the target of 
NMFS’ requirement, has no authority to demand 
state, or even other federal agency, participation in 
any such process, much less to demand any particu-
lar substantive outcome. 
 To date the Klamath experience suggests 
that, at best, the ESA is an uneven, weak catalyst.  
In Oregon, resistance to those changes continues.  In 
the spring of 2002, a coalition of environmental 
groups submitted a petition asking the Oregon Wa-
ter Resources Commission to place a moratorium on 
new appropriations on the Klamath and Lost Rivers.  
Given the recent water conflicts in the basin, the on-
going adjudication, and the fact that no new flow 
appropriations have been granted since 1997, that 
seemed a relatively mild request.  The Commission, 
however, with the support of the agricultural com-
munity, rejected the petition.99  
B. Counter-Culture Reactions 
 Subsequent events have largely tended to confirm our analysis 
and to reveal a number of specific problems with catalyst litiga-
tion.  Four developments stand out.  The first is a hardening of the 
position by those who want to maintain the status quo and a con-
sequent unwillingness to compromise.  The second, which is a 
symptom of the first, is the use of a counter catalyst.  The third is 
that the focus on legal and regulatory solutions create disincen-
tives to seek alternative, longer-lasting solutions to the problem.  
The final development is the ease with which strict enforcement of 
the ESA can be avoided.  This problem is discussed in Section V of 
this Article.  This Section focuses on the second and third prob-
 
 99. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 348-49 (citations omitted). 
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lems. 
 Rule of law litigation is a game that anyone can play, and the 
Klamath irrigators, emboldened by a Supreme Court decision that 
allowed them to challenge Biological Opinions100 and the 2002-
2003 National Research Council Reports, tried to land a knock-out 
punch.  To wipe out the successful ESA cases which held that the 
existence of vested state water rights was not a defense to compli-
ance with the ESA, the irrigators tried to ride the current property 
rights wave and brought a Court of Claims Fifth Amendment tak-
ings suit for more than a billion dollars.101  However, this move did 
not succeed.  The court found that the federal government had ap-
propriated all of the non-appropriated waters in the basin for the 
Project and that the individual farmers only had contract rights, 
rather than property rights.  It refused to follow an earlier case102 
that had found a physical taking.103  Specifically, the court noted 
that many Reclamation contracts, including those in the Klamath, 
absolved the government of liability for “water shortages—
hydrologic, regulatory, or hybrid—that may occur within the sys-
tem.”104  It also suggested that even if the contracts did not specifi-
cally provide for delivery interruptions, the ESA could be charac-
terized as a sovereign act which overrode the Bureau’s Reclama-
tion Act duties.  The court remanded for proceedings on contract 
claims, but the court again ruled against the irrigators.105
 The third reason recognizes that the regulatory system offers 
such powerful advantages to both sides and thus crowds out the 
search for alternative solutions.  In a recent paper, a group of re-
searchers studied the failure of a voluntary watershed planning 
process, cemented by compliance social norms rather than legal 
duties, to emerge on the an Illinois river.  Building on the founda-
tion work of Elinor Ostrom, which challenges the assumption that 
private commons management is always tragic,106 they concluded 
that the enforcement or threat of enforcement of stringent resource 
 
 100. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997). In holding that the ESA citizen suit 
provisions applied to opponents of species conservation, Justice Scalia unilaterally rewrote 
the legislative history of the ESA with his incredible statement that the primary purpose of 
the Act was “to avoid needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously 
but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives.” Id. at 176-77. 
 101. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 67 F.Cl. 
504 (2005). 
 102. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.Cl. 313, 317 (2001).  
 103. Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. at 537. 
 104. Id. at 535 (quoting Brian Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2002)). 
 105. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007) 
 106. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).     
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management laws can crowd out other regimes by transferring 
power to progressively higher levels: 
Underneath and alongside . . . formal governing bod-
ies, numerous formal and informal institutions of 
“civil society,” ranging from state-chartered corpora-
tions and organizations to customary associations 
and social orderings have more-or-less formalized 
rules governing their behaviors. In a locality such as 
the Cache, where many individuals live within 
widely ramifying sets of kin and other long-standing, 
multi-generational relations, these informal govern-
ing rules often override formal laws. The overlap-
ping jurisdictions of formal and informal institutions 
create a governing terrain in which “custom” can be 
as significant as formal procedures.107
 It may nonetheless be premature to write off the catalyst the-
ory.  Despite the Bush Administration’s efforts to defang the ESA, 
it retains vigor.  Downstream fishermen have been able to use the 
ESA to successfully challenge the Bush Administration’s efforts to 
push forward all serious compliance with Biological Opinions that 
require water cutoffs.108  In 2006, a federal district court held that 
the Bureau of Reclamation had to release water, at the expense of 
the project, to support threatened Coho in the Lower Basin.109
 
 107. Adams, Jane et al., Watershed Planning: Pseudo-democracy and its Alternatives — 
The Case of the Cache River Watershed, Illinois, 22 AGRIC. AND HUMAN VALUES 327, 332 
(2005).  
 108. See infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.  
 109. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2006 WL 
798920 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The Ninth Circuit had previously held that the Bureau’s release 
plan (or non-plan) was arbitrary. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). The Bureau practically guaranteed the result 
by adopting a Biological Opinion in 2002 which phased in downstream protection over ten 
years and delayed the provision of the full amount of water necessary to protect the Coho 
until year nine. BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 39.  The court easily 
found that the BiOp failed to analyze adequately the impact of the effect of the delay on the 
Coho in years one through eight.  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 426 F.3d at 1090. 
In short, it carried its own “death wound” by adopting policies that it could not support with 
credible science. The injunction was upheld in Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 226 Fed. Appx. 715 (9th Cir. 2007). The years of litigation that led 
to this decision are set out in Wood, supra note 53. 
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V. COASE IN THE KLAMATH OR PROPERTY RIGHTS ASSIGNMENTS 
ALSO MATTER 
A. The Necessity for Property Rights 
 Ecosystem services require the creation of new property rights.  
The Klamath is an ecosystem in which long-established property 
rights, primarily water rights, reenforce resistance to fundamental 
change.  This Section addresses the question of how existing prop-
erty rights can facilitate or hinder the necessary changes in the 
system.  In theory, the existence of entrenched property rights is 
no stranger to efficient change.  Ronald Coase received the Nobel 
Prize in economics for his article The Problem of Social Cost.110  
Coase’s theorem posits that, absent transaction costs, parties will 
bargain toward an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the 
initial allocation of property rights.  Critics have long pointed out 
that a world of zero or minimal transaction costs seldom exists and 
that the initial assignment of rights can strongly influence the re-
allocation options.  This section argues that when private provid-
ers are involved, the level of service provision, if any, is a partial 
function of the property entitlement claimed by the presumptive 
provider.  The more entrenched the initial entitlement, the more 
pressure there will be for both forced reallocations and bribes. 111  
Proponents of a Coasian solution must take full account of the loss 
of power and self-esteem that all change, forced or compensated, 
brings.  The situation for public providers is different; public own-
ership often carries with it the discretion, but seldom the duty, to 
dedicate land and water to ecosystem provision.  Thus, the result 
is often the same: the under-provision of ecosystem services be-
cause of the power of entrenched private entitlements and expecta-
tions that public resources will be dedicated to commodity produc-
tion. 
 A necessary condition for the provision of ecosystem services is 
the existence of a defined, consistent provider.  Proponents of ser-
vice provision would prefer that a beneficiary also be identified and 
that the two be linked through markets.  However, providers can 
provide services as a bi-product of other activities either because 
they are forced to or because they are bribed to so.  Thus, the class 
of beneficiaries can be an identifiable group or society at large.  
Once the provider is identified, the question turns to the relation-
ship between property rights and ecosystem service provision.  The 
 
 110. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 111. I use “bribe” in the classic economics sense: a person changes his or her behavior in 
response to a legal payment of money.  
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root of the problem is that the relationship is often negative be-
cause private entitlements are difficult to modify even when 
money may be available to do so. 
B. Property Rights in the Klamath: Entrenched Entitlements  
Resist Change 
 Western national resources law has a fundamental bias toward 
resource exploitation, and the legislative process has generally op-
erated, at least until recently, to reinforce the expectation that 
there will be few limits on exploitation.  Western water law is a 
prime example, as it is a product of the legacy of late Roman legal 
thought.  The modern notion of property remains rooted in the 
Roman notion of exclusive dominion subject only to the duty not to 
cause a nuisance.  For example, this view lies behind the Supreme 
Court’s dismissal of the argument that the purchaser of highly 
regulated wetland property assumes the risk of a development de-
nial with the quip that  “[T]he State may not put so potent a Hob-
besian stick into the Lockean bundle.”112  Locke himself might be 
surprised that his labor theory has now incorporated the Roman 
right of ius abutendi, the right to destroy property.  Both the com-
mon law and the police power temper this discretion, but this leg-
acy has made it much harder to limit activities that degrade eco-
systems as opposed to the limitation of air, soil, and water as 
waste disposal sinks. 
 The combination of legal entitlements backed by the political 
process is at work in the Klamath to maintain the status quo.  The 
irrigators, supported by the Bureau of Reclamation, claim the right 
to apply water without regard to the environmental costs.  They 
rely on the doctrine of prior appropriation, which is a practical, in-
tuitive response to the seasonable unreliability of western water 
supplies.  Miners developed the custom of allocating rights by pri-
ority rather than trying to use the vague equal sharing rules of the 
common law of riparian rights.  Courts sanctioned this custom as 
an acceptable risk distribution scheme for the arid west,113 but the 
 
 112. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). Professor J.B. Ruhl partially 
disagrees with this analysis and argues that the common law has the potential to adapt 
over a long period of time to recognize a duty of ecosystem provision. J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. 
KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, 266-271 
(2007). See Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. 2006), the Supreme 
Court’s decision on remand, which held that the state could deny the permit because drain-
ing and filling would be a nuisance. 
 113. For example, at a time when the public use doctrine limited the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain to property which would be used by the public, the Supreme Court 
upheld a Utah statute allowing appropriators to condemn ditch right of ways across private 
lands because of “some peculiar condition of the soil or climate, or other peculiarity of the 
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rhetoric of Western water law has obscured the high level of risks 
inherent in prior appropriation and instead has stressed the illu-
sory firmness of water rights.  The Reclamation Era was premised 
on the expectation that federal government would eliminate most 
risk or recurring periods of drought and highly variable rainfall 
patterns by carry-over storage.  Dams and reservoirs reduced but 
did not eliminate risk.  Because risk is inherent in water entitle-
ments, there should be no inherent legal barriers to management 
solutions that equitably reassign the risks of water shortages to 
accommodate all relevant uses and stakeholders in a basin and 
enhance the provision of ecosystem services.114  The federal recla-
mation program’s construction of carry-over storage reservoirs to 
back-stop water rights—not the law—is the main reason that wa-
ter rights are relatively firm regardless of the water year.  Thus, it 
has proved very difficult to add new risks to Western water rights. 
C. Ecosystem Service Property Rights 
 There are three counter strategies to the drag of existing enti-
tlements: (1) environmental group property rights, (2) forced real-
location through the ESA, and (3) bribes.   
1.  Public and Group Environmental Property Rights 
 Two federal property rights exist in the Klamath that could po-
tentially be dedicated to ecosystem provision and offset the effects 
of irrigation.  Both the Upper Basin’s wildlife refuges and the 
Klamath Tribe can claim water rights that can be dedicated to ser-
vice provision, but the potential of these rights to provide consis-
tent long term, ecosystem services is limited.  Due to the fact that 
western settlement preceded effective federal control over the pub-
 
state . . . .” Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905). 
 114. The California Supreme Court has recently sanctioned a new risk-based law of 
flood control liability. Bunch v. Coachella  Valley Water District, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (1997), 
holds that a public entity which diverts water from a natural watercourse that has histori-
cally flooded adjacent lands and constructs flood control works that fail in a major rain 
event is only liable if it acted unreasonably in designing, constructing and operating the 
project.  
 
[T]he only way to determine whether a damaged private landowner has . 
. . been forced to contribute a compensable “disproportionate” share of 
the public undertaking is to determine whether the system, as designed, 
constructed, and operated and maintained, exposed him to an “unrea-
sonable” risk of harm, either individually or in relation to other land-
owners.  
 
Id. at 100-01.    
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lic domain, states gained the power to allocate water in the west 
and have long claimed that this historical accident excludes federal 
control.  There is no constitutional basis for this claim; it rests en-
tirely on Congressional forbearance and this has been eroded over 
time.115
 Three twentieth century historical moments have restored a 
measure of federal power under the Commerce and Property pow-
ers: the conservation movement, tribal sovereignty, and the envi-
ronmental movement.  First, the conservation era first produced a 
special class of federal water rights for Indian tribes and public 
land withdrawals.  These are mixed riparian and appropriative 
rights.  A federal reserved right has a priority date, but unlike an 
appropriative right, it need not be put to beneficial use to be per-
fected.  Like a riparian right, it can be claimed at any time and can 
encompass ecosystem conservation, at least for the maintenance or 
revival of historic fisheries.  But federal claims remain limited in 
scope and quantity and are seldom robust enough to support the 
desired range of ecosystem services. 
 Until the 1963 decision in Arizona v. California,116 Westerners 
assumed that only Indians had federal water rights.  In the epic 
litigation to divide the Lower Colorado River, the Supreme Court 
held that the federal government can claim non-Indian federal re-
served rights to fulfill the purposes of a public land withdrawal.117  
Arizona v. California and a subsequent case initially took an ex-
pansive view of reserved rights.118  They could be implied to fulfill 
the purpose of a reservation.  However, this view did not survive. 
In United States v. New Mexico,119 the Supreme Court limited im-
plied public land rights to the minimum amount necessary to ful-
fill the primary (not secondary) purposes of the reservation and 
made it extremely difficult for the public land agencies to obtain a 
fraction of the water they need to manage public lands consistent 
with the expanded ecosystem conservation mandates of Congress.  
The Forest Service claimed instream flows for a wilderness area, 
but the majority reasoned that the 1897 Organic Act limited the 
purpose of national forests to “securing favorable conditions of wa-
ter flows” for downstream irrigators and cities and “furnish[ing] a 
 
 115. California Oregon Power v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 
(1935) (three Congressional Acts severed western waters from the public lands and made 
them “subject to the plenary control of the designated states”). 
 116. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).  
 117. Id. at 597-98. 
 118. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
 119. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The definitive history of the litigation is discussed in G. Emlen 
Hall, The Forest Service and Western Water Rights: An Intimate Portrait of United States v. 
New Mexico, 45 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 979 (2006).  
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continuous supply of timber.”120  The court subsequently held that 
both Indian and Non-Indian federal reserved water rights could be 
adjudicated in the state court General Adjudications, but the 
states had to apply federal standards.  The net result is that New 
Mexico has made it difficult but not impossible for the federal gov-
ernment to assert non-Indian reserved water rights for public 
lands withdrawals.  For example, after the case, the Forest Service 
tried to assert reserved rights for sediment transport.  A Federal 
District Court agreed that stream integrity was a favorable condi-
tion, but held that the flows were not necessary to support this hy-
drologic function.  The federal government has filed many public 
land claims as well as instream flow claims under state law.  In 
Colorado and Idaho, the Forest Service encountered a Catch 22: 
state instream flow rights can only be held by a state agency.121  In 
addition, Idaho has developed a substantial anti-federal reserved 
rights jurisprudence for wildlife refuges based on the court’s “read-
ing” of history.122  The federal government has fared better in Ore-
gon, but it has not been able to reverse the years of the subordina-
tion of the refuges to irrigation. 
a.  Klamath Wildlife Refuge Rights 
 The refuges are wetlands depending on water to survive and 
can claim federal water rights, but water law has long split water 
from land and limited the ability of the federal government to 
claim water rights for public lands.  For years the refuges’ water 
flow was under the control of irrigators; the refuges got return 
flows and any water not needed for irrigation.  For example, water 
has been delivered to the Klamath National Wildlife Refuge, but it 
has always been the lowest delivery priority so it often receives 
only polluted agricultural waste water.  
 Wildlife refuges are a category of public land withdrawal which 
falls between the limited use mandates that characterize (or once 
 
 120. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 714. 
 121. In re Matter of the Amended Applications of the United States for Reserved Rights 
in the Platte River, Case No. W-8439-76 (Feb. 12, 1993). See Teresa Rice, Colorado Water 
Court Denies Reserved Rights Claims for Channel Maintenance, 4 RIVERS 146 (1993) (no 
longer published). 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Idaho, 23 P.3d 117, 128-29 (Idaho 2001) (finding it “in-
conceivable” that President Franklin D. Roosevelt would give preference to waterfowl over 
irrigation when he created a wildlife refuge in the Snake River island in 1937, in the midst 
of the dust bowl); Potlatch v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1268 (Idaho 2000) (reserved 
rights do not attach to wilderness areas; Wilderness Act does not protect watersheds be-
cause Senator Frank Church, D-Idaho, would have never voted for the Act because recogni-
tion of such rights would cripple economic growth in Idaho). Wyoming has a similar tradi-
tion. See, e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River 
System (Big Horn III), 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).  
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did) the national park system and the expansive, open-ended mul-
tiple use management mandates of withdrawals such as forests 
and grazing lands.123  They grew in an uncoordinated fashion by 
the creation of individual areas. Refuges management has steadily 
evolved toward ecosystem conservation, but it took decades for this 
view to crystallize and, thus, multiple use philosophy has domi-
nated thinking about refuges until recently.  A comprehensive or-
ganic act was not passed until 1997.  Under the National Wildlife 
Refuge System Improvement Act, the primary mission of the sys-
tem is now to conserve and to restore wildlife habitats.124  How-
ever, multiple-use is embedded in wildlife refuge law, especially in 
the Klamath, and specific uses control over the more ecosystem 
conservation mandate. 
 The Klamath Project sits squarely in the Pacific Flyway, the 
major migratory route for birds in western North America, and 
refuges were created shortly after the Project was authorized.  The 
progressive conservation era had already reached the Klamath Ba-
sin by the time the Project was constructed.  President Theodore 
Roosevelt is credited with creating the first refuge in 1903 when he 
set aside Pelican Island in Florida to preserve a breeding ground 
for native birds.125  Shortly thereafter, two wildlife refuges were 
created in Tule and Lower Klamath Lakes.126  The Tule Lake ref-
uge has the distinction of being the first refuge to be superimposed 
on “a watershed being revamped by the Reclamation Service.”127  
President Taft later established the Clear Lake National Wildlife 
Refuge in 1911.128  The refuge lands were within the project 
boundaries.  However, Reclamation Service botanists concluded 
that the two could co-exist, and as a result ecosystem function and 
services have been consistently subordinated to irrigation.129
 The Klamath refuges were not initially recognized as valuable 
ecosystem fragments.  They had to struggle to survive and to per-
form their wildlife conservation function, although refuges should 
have been easy to maintain.  The soils in the lower Klamath were 
too alkaline for crops, but the pressures of settlement prevailed.  
In 1915, President Wilson reduced the size of the Lower Klamath 
 
 123. See generally Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the 
Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457 (2002); Robert L. Fisch-
man, The Significance of National Wildlife Refuges in the Development of United States 
Conservation Policy, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2005) 
 124. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2). 
 125. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 76. 
 126. Id. at 79.  
 127. Id. at 77.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
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Lake Refuge from 80,000 to 53,600 acres.130  A Lower Klamath 
drainage basin district was organized, and the lake was drained 
and reduced to a 365-acre pond.131  Homesteading began in the 
Tule Lake area in 1916 and did not end until 1949, one of the last 
gaps in the great project of public land disposition.132  In 1946, 
during the last gasp of the nineteenth century homestead experi-
ment, farmers in Tule Lake were threatened by the annual migra-
tion of waterfowl along the Pacific Flyway, and the Fish and Wild-
life Service stepped in to practice what we might now call adaptive 
management.  Pressured to take action, the FWS tried a number of 
methods to help the farmers clear their fields of waterfowl.  Using 
military surplus equipment such as smoke grenades, searchlights, 
and small airplanes, the FWS herded the birds back into the ref-
uges.  The service also issued permits that allowed local farmers 
and their Mexican laborers to scare birds from the fields with 
shotguns and flares.  The combined efforts of these groups con-
tained the birds on the refuge until farmers completed their har-
vest.  For the most part, the birds remained there until hunters 
came to kill them after the beginning of hunting season in October 
or until they flew south to their wintering grounds in California’s 
Central Valley and Mexico.133
 The environmental consequences of the draining of the lake 
were clear.  The area turned into a “desert waste of dry peat and 
alkali.”134  The peat periodically burned.  Restoration began in 
1941, when excess water from Tule Lake was diverted back into 
Lower Klamath and the birds returned.135  Farmers learned to 
leach the soils; thus, like many refuges, they receive nutrient-rich 
return flows instead of clean water.136  In 1964, Senator Thomas 
Kuchel of California succeeded in passing legislation for the ref-
uges.137  Waterfowl management was declared the major purpose 
of the refuge but “with full consideration to optimum agricultural 
use.”138  The federal government was authorized to lease lands in 
the Upper and Lower Klamath refuges and the Tule Lake refuge 
for crops.139  This multiple use not only benefits farmers in refuges, 
but over time, one of the rationales for crop raising is that migra-
 
 130. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 78. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 81, 85. 
 133. Robert M. Wilson, Directing the Flow: Migratory Waterfowl, Scale, and Mobility in 
Western America, 7 Environmental History 247 (2002). 
 134. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 79. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 86. 
 138. 16 U.S.C. § 695l (1964). 
 139. Id.  
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tory birds will feast in this area and fewer will fly on to the Central 
Valley and eat higher valued crops.  In fact, about seventy-five 
percent of the leased lands in the refuge are for grain crops on 
which the birds feed.  Legislation passed in 1964 allows leasing, 
but it does not protect farmers from the market.  Farm sales de-
creased in the Refuge from some $30 million in the 1980s to 
around $20 million in the 1990s.140  An Environmental Assessment 
disclosed substantial adverse impacts to the refuge’s ecosystem.141  
However, there has been no systematic assessment of the value of 
its ecosystem services, although they can reasonably be expected to 
increase substantially in the future as the area becomes more of a 
“life style” destination.  A 2002 Fish and Wildlife Study found that 
visitor expenditures were around $2 million dollars and generated 
$797,600 in employment income142 at the same time that the Final 
Environmental Assessment for the continued leasing program re-
ported lease revenues of only $1,884,026 in 1996, the last year sur-
veyed.143  These ecosystem service values are expected to increase 
in the future.  Nonetheless, the FWS has implemented a pilot 
“walking wetlands” program in the refuge.144  Lands are alterna-
tively drained, put into potato production, and then flooded. 
 The federal government has begun to claim reserved rights for 
the refuges, but it is difficult to obtain sufficient quantities of wa-
ter to adequately support the ecosystem to which they attached.145  
The problems start with the uncertainty about all water rights in 
the basin.  Despite over 100 years of project operation, the 
Klamath Basin remains unadjudicated, although a state adjudica-
tion has been ongoing since 1975.146  Thus, the irrigators enjoy a 
vast advantage because their existing uses are de facto, but not 
necessarily de jure, measures of their actual water rights, even 
though they may in fact be entitled to less water than claimed.147  
In the Klamath adjudication, the U.S. Forest Service filed 212 
claims, the Bureau of Land Management filed fifty-two, and the 
 
 140. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFI-
CANT ACTION, IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM ON TULE LAKE NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE REFUGE 3.5.3 (2002), available at http://www.fws.gov/klamathbasinrefuges/Final 
Environmental/AgProgramEa.pdf [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]. 
 141. Id. at 4.1.1. 
 142. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BANKING ON NATURE 2002: THE ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE VISITATION 35 (2003), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/southeast/grants/BankingOnNature2002_101403.pdf. 
 143. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 141, at 3.5.2. 
 144. Natural Resources Conservation Service, United States Department of Agricul-
ture, Klamath Basin Conservation Partnership Accomplishments (2007), available at 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/feature/klamath/images/BrochureProgressReport2007.pdf. 
 145. See Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 303-05. 
 146. Id. at 302. 
 147. Id.  
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Fish and Wildlife Service filed twenty-two claims for the four dif-
ferent refuges. 
 The federal government has focused more on Indian claims 
than on refuge claims in the Klamath adjudication148 and has 
made major concessions to the irrigators.  Nonetheless, Oregon 
still contests the scope of the claimed rights.  For example, the 
United States agreed to take a 1985 priority date for the Klamath 
Marsh National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon, although the priority 
date would ordinarily be 1960, the date of the creation of the ref-
uge.  Oregon has agreed that the primary purpose of the refuge is 
migratory bird conservation and thus even under New Mexico, the 
United States is entitled to the minimum amount of water neces-
sary to prevent the frustration of this objective.  But the state has 
taken a harder line on the rights claimed in the Upper Klamath 
Wildlife Refuge with a 1928 priority date.  President Hoover’s 
original Executive Order described the purpose of the refuge as a 
“breeding ground for birds and wild animals,”149 but Congress de-
scribed the purpose as “to preserve intact the necessary existing 
habitat for migratory waterfowl in this vital area of the Pacific 
flyway.”150  Following the letter of New Mexico, Oregon claims that 
any water rights can only be used to manage waterfowl.151  These 
narrow readings, if upheld, limit the ecosystem service potential of 
the reserved right. 
b.  Indian Water Rights 
 Indian tribes can potentially claim federal water rights to large 
amounts of water including ecosystem service claims, although the 
latter have often been limited and must be adjudicated in state 
proceedings.152  Unfortunately, the Klamaths are unlikely to 
match the success of other tribes with a large potential irrigable 
reservation.153  Historically, the main purpose of federal Indian 
water rights has been to give Indians parity with white irrigators 
to speed Indian assimilation.  The primary standard for the right 
is the practicable irrigable acreage (PIA) of the reservation.154  The 
Court came close to replacing the standard with one much more 
 
 148. E.g., Adair v. United States, 723 F.2d 1394, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1983). 
 149. Exec. Order No. 4851 (1928). 
 150. 16 U.S.C.A. § 695k (2006). 
 151. Memorandum from Walter Perry, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources 
Section to Richard Bailey, Adjudicator, Water Resources Department, September 19, 1999.   
 152. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 153. BONNIE G. COLBY, JOHN E. THORSON & SARAH BRITTON, NEGOTIATING TRIBAL 
WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST (2005). 
 154.  Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963). 
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favorable to Indians,155 but PIA remains the law.  So far courts 
have agreed that PIA does not require a positive benefit-cost 
analysis and that tribes are not limited to farming methods in use 
at the time that the reservation was created.156
  PIA does the Klamath Tribe and the ecosystem no good.  
Nonetheless, the Klamath have successfully used the Winters157 
doctrine to increase their bargaining power within the basin and to 
bolster the ecosystem, although no Indian water right is actually 
devoted to ecosystem services.  The Tribe first had to establish its 
right to water even though its historic reservation had been termi-
nated by Congress in the last gasp of assimilation during the 
1950s.  In the end, Winters rights were attached to the remnant 
Tribe and to the lands severed from the reservation during the 
first wave of assimilation, the allotment era.  United States v. 
Adair held that the Klamath Termination Act expressly preserved 
pre-existing water rights, including an instream flow right neces-
sary to effectuate the hunting and fishing rights reserved to the 
Klamath Tribe by the 1864 treaty creating the reservation.158  
That water right, the court ruled, dated to time immemorial, not 
merely to the 1864 treaty.  With respect to allotted lands, the court 
held that Indian successors to the lands had a right to a portion of 
the tribal reserved right.159  Non-Indian successors enjoyed a 
slightly less secure right.160  Non-Indians acquire an 1864 priority 
to water sufficient to irrigate both the acreage under irrigation at 
the time of transfer and any additional acreage that may be rea-
sonably irrigated.161
 United States v. Adair was a significant and lasting tactical vic-
tory for the Klamath Tribe, but the Court of Appeals did not quan-
tify the tribe’s reserved rights and left many questions unan-
swered.  The instream flow right only gives the Tribes the right to 
enjoin depletions of the river when they threaten to interfere with 
protected hunting and fishing rights.162  In 2001, the United States 
 
 155. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River sys-
tem, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an equally divided Court sub nom. Wyoming v. 
United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989). 
 156. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 695 (1983). The Supreme Court subsequently held 
that non-Indian reserved rights were limited to the “principle purpose” of a land with-
drawal. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 716. This standard potentially applies to Indian water 
rights, but the Supreme Court has not limited Indian water rights as it has non-Indian fed-
eral reserved rights.  
 157. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1906). 
 158. 723 F.2d 1394, 1411-17.  
 159. Id. at 1415-17. 
 160. Id. at 1417. 
 161. Id. The right of non-Indian allottees had been previously recognized in Colville 
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 162. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411. 
238  JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 22.2 
 
                                                                                                                  
and the Tribes asked the federal district court to reopen the Adair 
decree to clarify the standard for determining the Tribe’s right af-
ter the Oregon Water Resources Department formally interpreted 
Adair to limit Indian use to a moderate living capped by the low 
level of hunting, fishing, and gathering activity in 1979.  The dis-
trict court subsequently expanded Adair to hold that the Tribe’s 
treaty water entitles it to sufficient water levels to support the 
necessary productive aquatic habitat which it defined as the habi-
tat currently used, not that used in 1864.163  This crabbed inter-
pretation of the Tribe’s treaty entitlement was rejected by the fed-
eral district court.  Instead, the Tribe has the right to whatever 
water is necessary to achieve a supported habitat.164
 The current bottom line is that the existence of water rights 
gives the Tribe important political and legal leverage, but has not 
fundamentally changed the status quo.  The Tribe’s potential 
rights are counter-balanced by the ability of the irrigators to con-
tinue to divert water by water rights which have not yet been de-
termined to be valid.  Despite the Klamath Tribe’s victories be-
tween 1983 and 2005, the Tribe is still waiting for a quantified wa-
ter right, while the Project and non-Project irrigators use much of 
the basin’s water to grow crops.  The Tribe’s right is essentially 
negative.  As the Ninth Circuit said in Adair, “the entitlement con-
sists of the right to prevent other appropriators from depleting the 
streams [sic] waters below a protected level in any area where the 
non-consumptive right applies.”165  Both the irrigators and the In-
dians will have to navigate their future in the context of a doctrine 
that is both stable and evolving, but which remains biased in favor 
of the status quo. 
2.  Are Coasian Bribes Possible in the Klamath? 
 Much of the writing on the provision of ecosystem services as-
sumes that existing property rights are a barrier to service provi-
sion, and thus existing right holders should be “bribed” though 
compensation to dedicate their property to ecosystem services.  
There are two distinct primary rationales for taking property 
rights as they lie.  The first is instrumental.  The arguments based 
on this rationale range from the straight-forward “real politick” 
argument that it is usually faster and cheaper to pay for the rights 
than to contest them to more nuanced arguments that compensa-
 
 163. United States v. Adair, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1278-79 (D. Or. 2002) vacated sub 
nom. United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003).   
 164. Adair, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273.  
 165. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411. 
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tion is necessary to overcome cultural biases against ecosystem 
service provision.166  The second rationale is an ethical justifica-
tion.  Property rights are a guarantee against sudden majoritarian 
changes in policy, regardless of the merits of the new policy.167  
Thus, clearly established rights must be respected.  The two prin-
cipal counter arguments are that the property right claimed may 
be less established and free of risks of change than the holders as-
sume and that payment creates a moral hazard problem.  A moral 
hazard is a law or social policy that encourages inefficient action 
because there will be no penalty for taking it. 168
 The Klamath farmers derive much of their political power from 
their water entitlements, water rights perfected by hard work un-
der the doctrine of prior appropriation and protected in a variety of 
waters by Oregon as well as federal law.  Irrigators have every in-
centive to hold their water rights until the harsh discipline of the 
market takes effect and the federal government withdraws from 
its historic role of buffering western farmers from this discipline.  
The Klamath water right holders are also encouraged to continue 
behavior with high potential private and social costs because they 
know that they will be compensated for any losses that they incur 
or that the government will bail them out, as it has, with emer-
gency relief.  The control of water in the Klamath is the key to the 
basin’s destiny.  Water entitlements are both a source and a mani-
festation of political power.  The Klamath experience to date sug-
gests that the case for sole reliance of a Coasian solution, which is 
indifferent to the assignment of property rights, should be care-
fully examined.  In addition to cultural resistance to the cold logic 
of efficiency, the existence of firmly entrenched rights will push 
authorities to adopt a solution that carries with it a high risk of 
“sub-optimization” if not failure.  For example, after the summer of 
2001, the Bureau of Reclamation created a faux water bank in the 
Klamath.169  It is a faux bank because it is not a permanent pool of 
water with deposits and withdrawals, but rather a series of ad hoc 
payments to irrigators to either retire land or drill wells.170  A 
2005 GAO report concluded that Reclamation gas met its flow tar-
gets, but the actual reduction of water use was difficult to quantify 
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 170. Id.  
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because Reclamation lacks “effective flow measurement equipment 
and monitoring data for the Klamath Project.”171  The net result 
was the Bureau accelerated groundwater depletion and did not 
provide enough water for downstream Coho Salmon support.172  
Finally, the rush to a Coasian solution also creates no incentive to 
explore the extent to which the claimed existing entitlements are 
immune to readjustment.  Water rights are as much about risk as 
they are about stability.  The focus should be on the actual expec-
tations that lie behind a use173 so that alternative ways of satisfy-
ing those expectations can be accommodated. 
3.  The ESA 
 As previously mentioned, the environmental movement 
reached the Klamath primarily through the ESA.  The Act has the 
potential to reallocate water rights, although any reallocation is 
likely to be seasonable.  Courts have consistently held that the ex-
istence of a vested state water right is no defense to compliance 
with the Act.174  Two courts of claims have split on the issue of 
whether withheld deliveries constitute a taking.175  The earlier dis-
cussion of the ESA suggested that the Act is less of a catalyst than 
many hope because the Act is vulnerable to reinterpretation in 
ways that make it difficult, but not impossible, to challenge in 
court.  In brief, after the 2001 summer and the interim National 
Research Council report, which rejected the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice’s conclusion on Upper Klamath Lake levels and questioned its 
conclusions about the need for downstream Coho salmon flows, the 
Bureau issued a new BiOp.176  The 2002 BiOp designated a rela-
tively wet period, 1990-1999, as the baseline, and the Bureau de-
veloped a ten-year operating plan for the project.  Upper Klamath 
Lake levels would be maintained at levels no lower than the aver-
age end-of-end elevations over a ten-year period and daily average 
Klamath River flows would be no lower than ten year averages 
 
 171. GAO, supra note 91, at 25. 
 172. Id. at 25-28.  
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plus a 10,000 acre foot April pulse for downstream smolt migra-
tion.177  
 The story of how the Bush II Bureau of Reclamation and De-
partment of Interior quickly tilted the balance from fish to farmers 
is both a tale of the legitimate use of the political process and the 
legacy of the environmental movement to limit the use of old-
fashioned influence politics to undermine statutes.  A 2002 report 
by the National Research Council took the Bureau off the hook for 
Upper Klamath lake levels and cast doubt on the benefit of mini-
mum flows for the Coho, but not for downstream flows.178  How-
ever, instead, of trying to implement its call for a broad menu of 
ecosystem restoration measures, the Bureau tried to protect the 
irrigators from all risks in its “creative” 2002 BiOp.179  The ten-
year plan was a deft way to push the problem as far into the future 
as possible by transferring the risks from upstream to downstream 
species in contravention to the mandates of the ESA.  Under pres-
sure, the National Marine Fisheries Service ultimately acceded to 
the 2002 BiOp, but with serious reservations.180  NMFS was con-
cerned primarily with the fact that because the Bureau had 
pushed the dates for full compliance with the target levels and 
flows to the end of the ten-year period,181 “the mean flows for each 
water year type will decline toward the minimums that occurred 
during the reference period,”182 which “is expected to increase the 
risk of extinction to Klamath Basin Coho Salmon”183 and the many 
scientific uncertainties in the assumptions behind the opinion.  
Not surprisingly, courts found that the plan did not adequately 
protect the Coho and invalidated most of it.184  To date, the down-
stream fisherman have not benefited from the decision; as previ-
ously mentioned, the 2006 Coho season was virtually eliminated 
because of low runs. 
 This is a familiar problem when courts apply the ESA to exist-
ing entitlements.  A similar story occurred on the Missouri River. 
In 2002 the National Research Council issued a report calling for 
the development of a new flow regime on the river to protect en-
dangered species and biodiversity generally.185  NGOs won a major 
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decision compelling the United States Army Corps of Engineers to 
release more water in the spring and less in the summer to benefit 
a listed fish,186 but the Department of Interior replaced the origi-
nal team which issued the Biological Opinion which provided the 
support for the modified flow regime.  A new opinion appeared, 
recommending against the original spring-summer release plan, 
and a federal district court upheld it.187  The Missouri ecosystem is 
still at risk. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The Klamath is a classic illustration of market under-
production to public goods.188  Instead of long term solutions, those 
that emerge tend toward the negative state of affairs described by 
a leading Italian anti-Fascist diplomat in characterizing his objec-
tive in negotiating a post-World War I treaty between Italy and 
the newly created Yugoslavia: “that the causes of discontent 
should be equally divided between the two nations.”189  This may 
be the best that one can hope for among nation states, but ecosys-
tem and biodiversity conservation require a more affirmative re-
sponse if this laudable objective is to be realized.   
 The modification of the unsustainable status quo in the 
Klamath with institutions that recognize the value of the Basin’s 
ecosystem services and encourage their production, by payments or 
legal duties, remains an unfulfilled aspiration in the Klamath.  
There are, however, some hopeful signs.  The relicensing of Iron 
Gate dam has created a forum.  The existence of entrenched prop-
erty rights combined with a Bureau of Reclamation committed to 
supporting them to the maximum extent possible with the ESA 
creates powerful incentives not to seek a permanent solution built 
around ecosystem service provision.  Litigation to compel stringent 
regulation or to prevent it remains the preferred mode of problem 
solving.  Let us hope that in the twenty-first century, the real 
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